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Themotivating insight of speech-act theory is that we do many things by speaking,
but one can’t normally tell what someone is doing merely from the expressions that
they utter. In the terminology introduced by Austin (), the locutionary act of
uttering a given sentence with a given meaning does not determine the illocution-
ary act that one thereby performs. For example, someone who utters () might be
describing local bylaws or issuing a command. For that matter, they may be joking
around, speaking sarcastically, or acting in a play.
() You can’t park your car there.
Austin further distinguished illocutionary acts from perlocutionary acts—acts per-
formed by performing illocutionary acts and whose nature depends on the down-
stream consequences of those illocutionary acts. By commanding someone not to
park next to the hydrant, one might also perform an act of annoying them and an
act of making them move their car, for example.
So what does it take to perform an illocutionary act, and what makes it an il-
locutionary act of one kind rather than another? The central task of a theory of
speech acts is to answer these questions, and the main contenders in speech act the-
ory give different answers. In §, we will describe an ongoing debate between three
families of answers, which ground the nature of illocutionary acts in conventions,
intentions, and normativity, respectively.
When conducted wholly within the philosophy of language, the debate between
these views can seem abstractly metaphysical. In §, we will survey a range of issues
in social and political philosophy that can be profitably understood as applications
*To be published in the Routledge Handbook of Social and Political Philosophy of Language, edited
by Justin Khoo and Rachel Sterken. Thanks to Justin Khoo and Matthew McKeever for feedback on
an earlier draft.
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of speech-act theory. We will consider the roles of speech acts in the social contract
(§.), the nature of laws (§.), the nature of social norms and practices (§.), the
mechanisms by which speech may be silenced (§.), and freedom of speech (§.).
It will turn out that debates about the roles of conventions, intentions, and norms
show up in many of these venues. Our contention is that the intricacies of debates
about speech acts are actually widely applicable to the social and political realms.
 Speech-ActTheory
The three theories of speech acts on which we will focus all emerged in the ’s
and ’s, and remain influential today. The first, originally developed by J. L.
Austin (; ; ), is that illocutionary acts are conventional procedures
whose conditions of felicitous performance are defined by localized social conven-
tions. Different illocutionary acts, on this view, are performed by acting in accor-
dance with different linguistic or social conventions. The second view, originating
in the work of Paul Grice (; ; ) and translated into the idiom of speech
acts by P. F. Strawson (), is that many illocutionary acts are performed by act-
ing with overt, audience-directed intentions. Different illocutionary acts are distin-
guished by the fact that they are performed with intentions to change others’ minds
in different ways. The third view, which originates in the work of Wilfrid Sellars
(; ), is that speech acts (along with intentional mental states) should be un-
derstood in terms of their functional roles in broader patterns of “norm-conforming
behavior”—activities that are constitutively governed by social norms (Sellars, ,
). On this view, different illocutionary acts are governed by different norms and
give rise to normatively different outcomes.
Rich traditions have followed in the wakes of these theories. Conventionalists
have followed Austin in taking illocutionary acts to be primarily a matter of con-
vention, though latter-day conventionalists have often placed greater emphasis on
narrowly linguistic conventions rather than the broadly social conventions empha-
sized by Austin. Conventionalism has some obvious things going for it. We nor-
mally do perform speech acts by exploiting linguistic conventions. Andmany of the
There are several other theories of speech acts that we won’t discuss in detail here. One view, orig-
inally stemming from some remarks by Wittgenstein (, –), is that at least some speech acts
are be direct expressions of the speaker’s states ofmind—see Bar-On (, ); Davis (); Green
(); Pagin (). Another, which takes inspiration from Sellars’ functionalism while eschewing
his appeal to normativity, understands illocutionary acts in terms of the effects on addressees that it is
their proper function to produce (Harms, ; Millikan, ; Skyrms, ; Zollman, ). For a
more comprehensive survey of recent work on speech acts, see Harris et al. (); and for the history
of these views, with emphasis on the influence of Wittgenstein, see Harris (fc).
Alston (); Lepore and Stone (, , ); Searle (, , , ); Searle and
Vanderveken ().
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speech acts emphasized by Austin, such as the act of marrying someone or chris-
tening a ship, really could not be performed except against the backdrop of com-
plex social conventions and institutions. It may be similarly tempting to think, as
Searle () influentially argued, that, for example, asserting that you have a PhD
in philosophy just isn’t something that could be done without without the aid of
convention-governed linguistic expressions.
Intentionalists tend to agree that Austin was roughly right about the institu-
tionalized acts on which he focused, but argue that Grice was right to think that the
basic communicative acts, such as asserting, requesting, and questioning, are not
essentially conventional. They are, rather, exercises of basic human capacities for
inferring and shaping others’ states of mind. They have offered several influential
arguments against across-the-board conventionalism. One is that we often com-
municate indirectly and nonliterally, so that what we mean diverges from or goes
beyond the conventional meaning of what we utter. When Romeo says to Juliet
that death “hath sucked the honey of thy breath”, it is only by going beyond the
conventional meanings of “sucked” and “honey” that Romeo means what he does.
Moreover, even when we are speaking literally and directly, our conventions don’t
fully determine the content and force of an illocutionary act. Our example () il-
lustrates this point, but so do arguably all other sentences, given the ubiquity of
context-sensitive expressions and the possibility of using any sentence in a normal
interaction, in a joke, when acting in a play, and so on. Finally, as Grice () took
pains to illustrate, we seem able to regularly perform communicative acts by non-
linguistic and unconventional means. Indeed, it would seem necessary to suppose
that communication can happen in the absence of conventions in order to explain
how those conventions are created and acquired by children in the first place (Har-
ris, ). For these reasons, intentionalists tend to think that although linguistic
convention plays an important role in allowing speakers to give evidence of their
intentions, communicative acts are not inherently conventional.
The third major family of theories tells us that illocutionary acts are fundamen-
tally normative. One kind of theory in this family, which owes much of its popular-
ity toWilliamson (; ), analyzes illocutionary acts in terms of the norms that
Bach and Harnish (); Harris (); Schiffer (); Strawson ().
The most notable conventionalist response to this line of argument is to deny that what we do
when speaking metaphorically or indirectly is best understood as communicating or performing illo-
cutionary acts at all. See, for example, Lepore and Stone (, ). For criticisms of this argument,
see Camp (); Harris ().
Carston (); Condoravdi and Lauer (); Davidson (); Neale (, ); Recanati
(); Searle (); Sperber and Wilson (); Travis (); Wilson and Sperber (). The
most promising conventionalist strategy in response to this line of argument has been to argue that
intentionalists have failed to appreciate the richness of the discourse-level conventions that govern our
exchanges. See, for example, Lepore and Stone (), and Harris () for a response.
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constitutively govern them. Although these theories are quite influential, especially
among epistemologists, only assertion has received detailed attention. Williamson
argues that assertion is constitutively governed by the “knowledge norm,” according
to which one should assert only what one knows. On Williamson’s view, this is not
merely a norm that happens to govern assertions; being governed by this norm is
what makes a speech act an assertion. His most influential argument for this claim
is that the account explains why it is normally infelicitous to assert something of
the form, ‘p, but I don’t know that p’. Few conventionalists and intentionalists have
been persuaded by this argument, however, since it is possible to accept that asser-
tion is governed by the knowledge norm while insisting that this follows from the
intentional or conventional nature of assertion together with broader norms that
govern all sorts of social interactions.
A second kind of normative theory has sought to analyze speech acts, alongwith
intentional mental states, such as belief, desire, and intention itself, in terms of the
commitments and entitlements that they involve. For example, we might think of
asserting p as the undertaking of a commitment to the truth of p—a commitment
that entitles the addressee to take the speaker at their word, to ask for supporting
reasons in case of doubt, and to rebuke the speaker if p turns out to have been false.
Again, themost obviousmotivation for this view is that speech acts typically do have
normative consequences like these. Of course, we might again try to explain how
these commitments and entitlements arise by appealing to a non-normative theory
of a given speech act, together with an account of how commitments and entitle-
ments arise from conventions or communication more generally (see, for example,
Harris ). Anothermotivation for normative views is to avoid the assumption—
common to intentionalism andmany versions of conventionalism—that intentional
mental states are explanatorily prior to, or more fundamental than, illocutionary
acts. Brandom () has argued that the intentionality of language and thought
are on an explanatory par, so that neither should be used to give an account of the
other. In place of such a reductive strategy, Brandom argues that we should explain
the intentionality of both speech and thought in terms of underlying normative con-
cepts. Thismotivation itself has often been a target of criticism. One problem is that
the approach seems to conflict with theories that attribute intentional mental states
to nonlinguistic creatures, such as animals and young children. For example, many
models of language acquisition tell us that young children learn the meanings of
words in part by forming beliefs about other language users’ beliefs and intentions
(see, e.g., Bloom , ch.). Some critics have also worried that normativity is a
On this and related issues, see Ball (); Benton (); Sosa ().
Brandom (, , ); Geurts (); Kukla (); Kukla and Lance (); Lance and
Kukla (); Peregrin ().
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dubious unexplained explainer in the context of theories of these kinds (e.g. Rosen
).
Speech-act theorists have found ways of abstracting away from their founda-
tional disagreements, at least for some purposes. The most widespread method
involves the idea that conversations revolve around discourse contexts, which are
databases of information that affect how speech acts are performed and that are in
turn updated by the performance of speech acts. The most influential model of this
kind is due to Stalnaker (; ; ), who takes a discourse context to be the
set of propositions that interlocutors are treating as common ground for the pur-
poses of their conversation. To assert p, says Stalnaker, is to propose adding p to
the common ground. Others have generalized this idea to other speech acts. For
example, Roberts (; ) thinks of asking a question as a proposal to add a
new “question under discussion” to the context—the question that it is the partic-
ipants’ immediate conversational goal to answer. And Portner (; ; )
models directives and permissions as proposals to alter the “to-do list”, which he
thinks of a component of the context that tracks the preferences on which the par-
ticipants’ have coordinated. An influential generalization of these ideas is due to
Lewis (), who argues that we should think of the context of a conversation as
being akin to the scoreboard of a baseball game, tracking all facts about a conversa-
tion that may play a role in determining how it will unfold and that may be altered
by the performance of further speech acts. Following Lewis, it is common to refer
to a conversation’s discouse context as its “conversational score,” or “scoreboard.”
These ideas are abstract enough that they can be made to fit with each of the
competing theories of speech acts discussed above. On the intentionalist construal,
the discourse context consists of the participants’ shared states of mind, and il-
locutionary acts are understood in terms of their intended effects on these states
(Roberts, ; Stalnaker, ; Thomason, ). The conventionalist interpre-
tation thinks of the context as a social construct whose state is determined by the
conventions governing a conversation together with the objective facts about its
history—facts that may trump the intentions of speakers and the shared attitudes
of the interlocutors (DeVault and Stone, ; Lepore and Stone, ; McGowan,
). Within the tradition that thinks of speech acts in fundamentally normative
terms, the context can be thought of as the sum total of commitments, entitlements,
and other normative facts that are currently in play in a conversation (Brandom,
; Geurts, ; Nickel, ). Some theorists have argued that we need more
than one of these conceptions of discourse context to coexist within an adequate
theory of speech acts (Camp, ). More often, discussions of discourse context,
common ground, and conversational score take place at a level of abstraction that
Another early statement of a similar view is due to Gazdar ().
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ignores these different possible interpretations. This can facilitate interesting de-
bates across theoretical boundaries, but it can also mask deep theoretical disputes
in ways that confuse some issues.
 Social and Political Applications
. Speech Acts and the Social Contract
One of the major issues in the history of political philosophy is a question about
speech acts: how can agents make promises to each other? More specifically: how
can agents credibly make binding commitments to each other, such that they have
trust or assurance enough to motivate cooperation for mutual benefit? This ques-
tion lies at the heart of any inquiry into the nature of contracts, which the contrac-
tarian tradition has placed at the center of theories of the nature of both political
institutions and morality.
Hobbes gives us one classic answer: because each individual is such that they
are better off when they are able to cooperate and coordinate with others, and be-
cause each individual knows of others that this is true of them too, each individual
has a prima faciemotivation tomake commitments that another agent has reason to
accept as binding—hence, a promise. However, it is also common knowledge that
agents will have incentives to break promises. Hobbes argues that it is therefore ra-
tional for self-interested agents to develop some system of sanction to back up their
commitments to make them binding on pain of harm to reputation or punishment.
Thus Hobbes renders the speech act of promising (which can be irrational to
break) as the first step in a series that can eventually lead to contract (which can be
but is not always punishable upon breaking). The transition from promise (that is,
binding commitment) to promisewith a sanction upondefection (that is, assurance)
is key. Hobbes thus proposes to bootstrap a social contract (something like laws of
a commonwealth) out of mutually enforced promises:
Aman is obligated by an agreement, i.e. he ought to performbecause of
his promise. But he is kept to his obligation by a law, i.e. he is compelled
to performance by fear of the penalty laid down in the law (Hobbes,
, .n)
Note what is absent so far in this story: any appeal to practices, conventions,
customs, or prior rules. Hobbes may have answered how agents can in principle
Hobbes’ interest in and application of speech-act-theoretic ideas is not limited to his investiga-
tions into the social contract. We will discuss his theory of the nature of laws as imperatives in §..
Hobbes also takes speech acts to be of enough inherent interest that he offers an extended attempt at
a taxonomy in Chapter  of Leviathan ().
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form credible binding agreements and how—in principle—such agreements can
serve as the rational ground for something like a social contract, but so far such
agreements appear to be made through one-off promises, entered into on the ba-
sis of the recognition of an individual speaker’s intentions, and backed by (perhaps
fairly ad hoc) social sanction—harm to reputation or punishment by a sovereign.
He appears to think such a structure is possible, stable, and enforceable absent any-
thing like a convention of promise-making (though perhaps not absent a regularity
of promise-making). Another way of putting the point: Hobbes thinks agents in the
state of nature can promise.
Hume famously critiquesHobbes on this point, arguing that in order for promises
to be both credible and binding, agents must be party to a prior convention accord-
ing to which an utterance of “I promise...” counts as an instance of a type of action
recognizable even by third parties as generating commitment—hence other parties
will judge that an agent who breaks a promise has done something to violate a rule,
not merely something that happens to have disadvantageous consequences.
I say, first, that a promise is not intelligible naturally, nor antecedent to
human conventions; and that a man, unacquainted with society, could
never enter into any engagementswith another, even though they could
perceive each other’s thoughts by intuition. (Hume, , T ...,
SBN )
Here we see an early instance of what would become the debate between intention-
alism and conventionalism about speech acts. This debate about the nature of what
has come to be called “promissory obligation” picked up steam in the late th cen-
tury, among both political philosophers and philosophers of language alike.
One influential conventionalist about promising is Rawls (), who—foreshadowing
Lewis’s use of the same metaphor—describes the making of a promise as akin to a
move in a baseball game. He reasons as follows. Consider someone who makes
a promise and then—failing to do what is promised—tells the promisee that actu-
ally, upon reflection, it wasn’t all things considered the best thing to do after all.
We would judge such a person to be confused or misinformed about the nature of
promises—what it is to make one and what it requires one to do. Rawls says that we
would have grounds for judging the promiser to have misunderstood the practice
of promising. Similarly: consider the baseball player who asks the umpire “can I
have four outs?”—because it would be better overall for him, or his team, if it was
so. Such a player would be confused about what it is to play the game of baseball.
Rawls argues that such a question constitutes a confusion between practical ques-
For a more comprehensive overview of this debate than we can offer here, see Habib ().
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tions that are internal to a practice and questions about how to justify the practice
itself. Promissory obligation, Rawls thinks, is itself a practice-internal notion.
Building on Rawls’ ideas, Searle () uses promissory obligation as his case
study in how the conventional constitutive rules of a social practice can ground nor-
mative facts in non-normative facts. In later work, Searle builds his own theory of
speech acts around this same notion of a constitutive rule, again taking the act of
promising as his paradigm case (Searle, , ). On Searle’s view, to perform
an illocutionary act is to speak in a way that conforms to a collection of constitutive
rules, all of which ultimately apply in virtue of linguistic convention. To felicitously
promise, for example, requires that the speaker express a proposition to the effect
that they will perform some act, that the hearer would prefer the speaker to per-
form this act, that it is not obvious that the speaker would perform it anyway, that
the speaker forms an intention to carry out the act and for his utterance to place him
under an obligation to do so, that the speaker communicatively intends the hearer
to recognize that the speaker has these intentions, and that all of this follows from
the linguistic conventions governing the expressions that the speaker uses to per-
form their speech act. According to Searle, promising is not special in being made
possible by conventional constitutive rules of this kind. An analogous suite of rules
sets the parameters for the performance of any illocutionary act. Failure to keep a
promise, on Searle’s view, is analogous to violating the felicity conditions of other
illocutionary acts—for example, by asserting what one knows to be a falsehood.
There are some reasons to doubt that promising is constituted by the conven-
tional rules of a particular social or linguistic practice, however. One influential
argument, pressed by Scanlon (, Ch.), is that it really does seem possible to
make promises outside of any shared conventional framework, in the state of na-
ture. Scanlon imagines two hunters from tribes who have had no previous contact
and do not share a language, and whomeet on opposite sides of a river, having each
accidentally thrown their hunting weapons to the other’s side. Scanlon argues that
these two individuals can enter into a promissory arrangement, despite lacking a
common conventional framework in which to do so.
Instead of thinking of promissory obligation as a conventional practice, Scanlon
(; ) instead argues that we should think of it as arising from the expecta-
tions that a promiser instills in a promisee. To instill these expectations in some-
one and then fail to live up to them is to manipulate others in a way that is nor-
mally morally unacceptable. Scanlon explains this moral unacceptability by appeal
Aside from Rawls and Searle, other conventionalists about promising include Fried (); Gau-
thier (); Kolodny and Wallace ().
Similar arguments have been made by intentionalists to show that other speech acts, such as as-
serting, requesting, and asking questions are likewise not conventional acts. See, for example, Harris
(, ).
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to his own brand of contractualist ethics, while other expectation-based accounts of
promissory obligation appeal to other background theories of moral obligation.
On expectation-based views, promising is, first and foremost, a communicative act
whose point is to produce expectations in an addressee. Although Scanlon does not
commit himself to any particular theory of communication, his view fits naturally
with intentionalism, which is built to explain the possibility of communication in
the absence of convention. And at least some intentionalists have offered accounts
of promising that would fit in nicely with expectation-based accounts of promissory
obligation.
A third school of thought takes promissory obligation to be a normative status
that is more fundamental than any social convention but that is not reducible to the
promisee’s expectations. Theories of this kind take the act of promising to be fun-
damentally normative in nature: they take promises to be possible by virtue of our
powers to shape the normative statuses that govern us. Within this genre, theories
differ with respect to the nature and sources of the normative status involved. Some
examples: Raz () takes promissory obligation to be a kind of right enjoyed by
the promisee and created by the promiser as a result of communicating their inten-
tion to undertake a commitment. Shiffrin () argues that promissory obligation
and other related forms of commitment are “integral part[s] of the ability to engage
in special relationships in a morally good way, under conditions of equal respect”
(). Owens () argues that promising arises from moral agents’ legitimate
interest in having the ability to have authority over others (such as when one has
accepted their promise to do something).
Again, we can find norm-theoretic accounts of speech acts that fits nicely with
these views by social and political philosophers (see, e.g. Kukla and Lance , ,
). But by the same token, normative theories of promising are subject to some of
the same criticisms that face normative theories of speech acts more generally, some
of which we discussed in §.
. Speech Acts and the Law
What are laws? An answer inspired byThomas Hobbes and made influential by the
early legal positivists Jeremy Bentham () and John Austin () was that a law
is an “assemblage of signs” whose meaning is a command addressed by a sovereign
to their subjects and backed by the threat of force. ‘Imperativalism’, as this theory
is sometimes called, is no longer a popular view. Its most influential critic was
See, for example, Atiyah (); Norcross ().
For example: Schiffer (, –); Bach and Harnish (, ).
For others, see Hart (); Rosati (); Watson ().
Though, for a contemporary defense, see Landenson ().
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H. L. A. Hart (, §), much of whose criticism draws on ideas about speech acts
that resemble those of J. L. Austin. Hart argues that laws cannot be thought of
as pieces of language, although they are in many cases put into effect by linguistic
means. Ultimately, though, the fact that a given utterance—for example, a statute—
constitutes lawmust be due to extra-linguistic social conventions that govern a soci-
ety’s practices, institutions, and norms. Hart also argues that laws needn’t have the
force of commands or even permissions, but may instead confer a range of other
kinds of normative status, such as the power to enter into contracts or the right to
marry. The speech acts by which laws are created thus form a sub-category of what
Austin (, ) called exercitives—acts that bring new and often normatively
loaded facts into being. Moreover, in modern bureaucratic democracies, there is
no one entity that plays the role of the sovereign—the “speaker” of these exerci-
tives. Rather, city clerks, law enforcement, and regulators act as agents in relation
to a principal—representing the interests of the people within a domain of state au-
thority sharply indexed to an organizational role. In this respect laws resemble the
conventional procedures on which Austin focuses: passing legislation, like a felici-
tousmarriage ceremony, requires a structure that indexes rights and responsibilities
to institutional roles occupied by agents empowered to act on those powers. Hart
also points out that laws needn’t express any person’s will, may bemisunderstood by
the very legislators who vote on them, and may “bind the legislators themselves”; in
these respects they resemble Austin’s conventional acts more than they do ordinary
commands.
Austin himself emphasized the roles of exercitives in lawmaking, but he also
distinguishes them from a second category of speech acts, verdictives, that play a
related legal role (Austin, , ). Verdictives, he says, “consist in the delivering
of a finding, official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact” ().
A verdictive “is done in virtue of an official position: but it still purports to be correct
or incorrect, right or wrong, justifiable or unjustifiable on the evidence. It is not
made as a decision in favour or against” (). Paradigm cases include the decisions
of juries, arbitrators, umpires, and judges.
The question of how judicial decisions are justified is one of the central issues
in the philosophy of law. Consider the task faced by a judge when interpreting a
This collision of jurisprudence and speech-act theory was no coincidence. Hart was part of the
same postwar-Oxford scene that Austin and Grice inhabited, regularly attended Austin’s Saturday-
morning reading group, co-taught seminars with Austin, and later described Austin as his greatest
philosophical influence (Sugarman and Hart, , –). Hart also influenced Austin, and is
one of three philosophers cited by name in How to do Things with Words, where he is given credit for
helping Austin to understand the relationship between performatives and their felicity conditions by
analogy with the relationship between the “operative” part of a statute and “the rest of the document
[which] merely ‘recites’ the circumstances in which the transaction is to be effected” (Austin, , ).

statute or constitution in order to decide a case. As in ordinary communication,
the precise content and force of a piece of law often isn’t made satisfactorily deter-
minate by the words in which it is framed. Another way to put this is that legal
texts typically display a kind of semantic underdetermination—a phenomenon that
they presumably inherit from everyday language use, where semantic underdeter-
mination is endemic and perhaps inevitable.
Consider an example discussed by Scalia (, –) and Neale (, –
). Smith v. United States turned on the interpretation of Title , section
(c)() of the U.S. Code, which mandated a five-year prison sentence for anyone
who “uses…a firearm during and in relation to…[a] drug-trafficking offense”. John
Angus Smith had traded a bag containing an unloaded gun for two ounces of co-
caine, but had not brandished or threatened to use the gun at any time. The Supreme
Court was faced with the question of whether this counted as “using” the gun “dur-
ing and in relation to” the trade. The answer apparently turns on the question of
whether “using a gun” should be understood, for the purpose of this statute, as im-
plicitly equivalent to “using a gun as a weapon”. How should judges overcome se-
mantic underdetermination in cases like this one? What further information should
they be seeking? Or, to approach the issue from a different direction: In virtue of
what underlying facts does the law have the content and force that it does, such that
judges should be seeking out those facts? This central question about jurisprudence
turns out to be a question about the nature of speech acts.
The debate over how to answer these question has spawned a range of answers
that resemble different positions on the nature of illocutionary acts. For example,
intentionalists about the law (also known as ‘purposivists’) argue that the content
of the law is fixed by the intentions of those who create it, and that judges should
interpret a legal text by attempting to infer the legislative intent behind it. This sort of
reasoning dominated theAmerican courts until a few decades ago (Manning, ),
and is still common. There is some evidence that the Supreme Court reasoned this
way in deciding Smith v. United States. Here is an excerpt from Justice O’Connor’s
majority opinion, which upheld the lower courts’ opinion that trading a gun does
constitute using it.
Had Congress intended §(c)(I) to require proof that the defendant
Indeed the problem generalizes beyond judges: parties to a contract cannot specify in advance
every possible contingency that may occur. This—the problem of incomplete contracts—creates space
for disagreement, arbitrage, and opportunistic renegotiation. See e.g. Grossman and Hart ();
Hart ().
On semantic underdetermination in the law, see Marmor (); Neale (, ); Soames
().
 U.S.  ()
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not only used his firearmbut used it in a specificmanner—as aweapon—
it could have so indicated in the statute. However, Congress did not.
One straightforward argument for intentionalism about the law takes intention-
alism about ordinary communicative acts as a key premise. In ordinary communi-
cation, the argument goes, the content of what is communicated is always deter-
mined by the speaker’s intentions; the language used (and the conventions govern-
ing the language, as well as information about the context in which it was uttered,
and so on) only ever serves as partial and defeasible evidence of the speaker’s in-
tentions. But legal texts are formulated in the same language as ordinary commu-
nicative acts, and so it would be bizarre if language is (or even could be) serving an
entirely different, non-evidential role in that context. By analogy, then, we should
take the content of the law to be what was asserted or stipulated by the legislators,
and this is of necessity a matter of what they intended—something of which the
texts they create can only serve as partial evidence.
However, there are some important disanalogies between the law and most or-
dinary communicative acts with which any intentionalist about the law will have to
contend. One problem is that the legislators who pass a statute can’t consider ev-
ery possible eventuality, and so their intentions may not be determinate enough to
settle some cases. Smith v. United States provides a plausible example: legislators
may not have considered whether trading a gun for drugs should count as using it to
commit a crime, and so knowing their intentions might not help to settle the case.
This sort of thing happens in ordinary communication, which is not usually a big
problem: we can ask for clarification, or just let some indeterminacy slide. But a
judge who has to make a decision doesn’t have these options.
A second problem is that constitutions, statutes, and contracts are generally cre-
ated not by individual speakers but by groups of agents. This raises the question of
what it takes for a group of agents to collectively perform a speech act, and for the
intentionalist it raises the further question of what it takes for a group of agents to
intend something. Moreover, the members of a legislative body often have differ-
For this and related arguments, see Neale (, ); Soames (, ). For other de-
fenses of intentionalism about the law, see Ekins (); Ekins and Goldsworthy (); Fish ();
Goldsworthy (); Solan (). Marmor () defends a modified version of this view on which
legal interpreters should rely on the plain meaning of a text up to the point at which that fails to fully
determine the content of the law, at which point intentions enter the picture. Matczak () ar-
gues that the intentions grounding the illocutionary aspects of laws, and not merely their locutionary
aspects, should be considered the proper object of legal interpretation.
Soames (; ) argues that in such cases, the content of the law is itself indeterminate, and
it is the role of the judicial authority to make new law that is in keeping with the “original rationale
for the law”. If Soames is right, then judicial decisions are sometimes better understood as exercitives
rather than as verdictives.
There is a considerable philosophical literature on collective intentionality. For major recent

ent and even conflicting goals when they write and pass a piece of legislation. For
example, suppose we are able to determine that the creators of the above-discussed
statute had the following intentions: one third explicitly intended trading a gun to
count as using it, one third explicitly intended trading a gun not to count as using it,
and the remaining third were aware of this conflict, had no opinion on the matter,
and intended to deliberately leave the law underdetermined on this point so that the
other two factions would vote for the statute. What is the legislative intent in a case
like this? An intentionalist about the law owes us a principled way of answering
questions like this.
A third problem is that legislators’ intentions aren’t always easy to discern. Leg-
islators might even seek to hide their true intentions for political reasons, and the
causal pathway by which the specific wording of a statute is reached is usually in-
tricate and impossible to accurately reconstruct (Manning, , ). This issue
poses a special problem in the legal context, since it is important for the law to be
publicly accessible to those who are bound or empowered by it.
These and other problems have led some legal theorists to recoil from legislative
intentions, often under the banner of textualism—a theory of legal interpretation
that has become highly influential in recent decades, both among scholars and in
American courts. Textualism is often associated with a skepticism about the exis-
tence or legal relevance of legislative intentions, and with the idea that the content
of a legal text is the “plain meaning” that a reasonable language-user would extract
from it, independent of the author’s intentions. This position resembles convention-
alism about speech acts, which emphasizes the role of publicly accessible linguistic
conventions in determining the content and force of an utterance. Scalia (,
) tells us that this was the sort of textualist reasoning behind his his dissent in
Smith v. United States.
One way to see the central appeal of textualism is to understand it as a response
to the problem about how to aggregate the intentions or preferences of a group of
legislators. Textualists point out that the legislative process itself is our method of
accomplishing this aggregation, and that what survives this process is a legal text,
not any of the many possibly-conflicting intentions with which it was assembled,
works on group agency and intentions in particular, see Bratman (); Gilbert (); Ludwig
(, ); Tuomela (). For work on collective intentionality in general, see the chapters in
Jankovic and Ludwig (), and in particular Yaffe () on applcations to the law. Note that the
problem about collective speech acts is not specific to intentionalists. For work on collective speech
acts in general, see Hancher (); Lackey (); Ludwig ().
For attempts to overcome this problem, see Hurd (, –); Ekins (, –).
Influential defenses include Easterbrook (, ); Eskridge, Jr. (); Manning (, ,
); Scalia (, ).
Matczak () explicitly argues that Lepore and Stone’s recent push for conventionalism about
speech acts should be taken up by legal theorists who wish to do away with legislative intentions.
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andwhich are inaccessible to judges. It is the text, supplemented with public aspects
of its context, that should be understood to constitute the law (Manning, ).
Intentionalists have responded that there is no escaping legislative intentions,
because to interpret any utterance, including a legal text is, ipso facto, to infer the
intentions with which it was produced (Alexander and Prakash, ; Ekins, ;
Neale, ). Nonetheless, contemporary intentionalists have tended to include
constraints on legislative intentions to the effect that these intentions must be pub-
licly accessible to a reasonable person (Ekins and Goldsworthy, ; Neale, ;
Soames, ). And contemporary textualists no longer deny that a text can be in-
terpreted independently of context. Textualism and intentionalism have thus con-
verged in someways, and the debate between themhas become finer-grained (Man-
ning, )—much in the same way as the debate between intentionalists and con-
ventionalists debate about speech acts.
. Speech Acts and the Creation of Social Norms and Practices
In the context of the right social institutions, speech acts can create laws. Other
speech acts are similar in that they give rise to new normative statuses, but dissim-
ilar in that they are embedded in informal social practices rather than formalized
legal institutions. A parent might grant their children permission to use the fam-
ily car. A person might consent to a sexual act. Children playing a game of hide
and seek might decide to adopt the rule that a player can’t hide in the same spot
twice. Informal exercitives of these kinds have been of major interest to socially
and politically minded speech-act theorists in recent decades.
Consider Catharine MacKinnon’s () claim that the creation and distribu-
tion of pornography constitutes an act of subordinating women. MacKinnon begins
from the idea, encouraged by the American courts, that pornography is a kind of
speech. But, MacKinnon argues, it is a form of speech that must be understood not
merely in terms of what it represents, but in terms of what it does.
…But theway it works is not as a thought or through its ideas as such, at
least not in theway thoughts and ideas are protected as speech. Its place
in abuse requires understanding it more in active than in passive terms,
as constructing and performative rather than as merely referential or
connotative. (MacKinnon, , )
“Themessage of thesematerials,” she continues, “is ‘get her,’ pointing at all women…”
(). MacKinnon defines pornography as “graphic sexually explicit materials that
subordinate women through pictures or words. …This definition includes the harm
of what pornography says—its function as defamation or hate speech—but defines

it and it alone in terms of what it does—its role as subordination, as sex discrimina-
tion, including what it does through what it says” (MacKinnon, , ).
Several philosophers have attempted to defendMacKinnon’s claims about pornog-
raphy by explicitly framing them in the idiom of speech-act theory. The central
claim of this literature is that we should think of pornography as speech that subor-
dinates women as a matter of its illocutionary force, and not merely as a locution-
ary act that depicts subordination or a perlocutionary act of causing subordination.
Langton draws an analogy to acts of subordination in legislative contexts:
Consider this utterance: “Blacks are not permitted to vote”. Imagine
that it is uttered by a legislator in Praetoria in the context of enacting
legislation that underpins apartheid. It is a locutionary act: by “Blacks”
it refers to blacks. It is a perlocutionary act: it will have the effect,
among others, that blacks stay away from polling booths. But it is, first
and foremost, an illocutionary act: it makes it the case that blacks are
nor permitted to vote. It—plausibly—subordinates blacks. (Langton,
, )
Langton argues that pornography is like the South African legislator’s utterance in
that both acts unfairly rank some people lower than others, legitimate harmfully dis-
criminatory behavior toward them, and unjustly deprive them of important powers
(Langton, , –). Like the act of passing a law, Langton argues that the
creation and publication of pornography can itself bring into existence a new kind
of normative status.
Of course, there are disanalogies between pornography and the law. The leg-
islator’s authority to alter the normative facts derives from their formal position in
a legislative institution. Langton argues that pornography enjoys a kind of de facto
authority, in virtue of the role it plays in shaping norms about sexual power among
its consumers. As she puts it, pornography “shapes desire, eroticizing hierarchy”
(Langton, ). But it is important to Langton’s position that this shaping of de-
sire is a matter of pornography’s illocutionary force, rather than merely an effect of
repeated viewing (on this point, see Langton and West ).
Langton (a; b) andMcGowan (; ) have defended related the-
ories of how pornography exerts its authority that draws on work in the philosophy
of language about presupposition accommodation. If a speech act triggers a pre-
supposition, the act’s felicity depends on whether the presupposed proposition is
common ground (Stalnaker, , ). When someone presupposes something
Hornsby (); Hornsby and Langton (); Langton (, ); Langton andWest ();
Maitra (); McGowan (, ).
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that is not common ground, it is possible to object, though this typically has the ef-
fect of derailing the conversation, since presuppositions are typically “not at issue”.
If no one does object, then the presupposition is normally accommodated—silently
added to the common ground, as if through the back door (Lewis, ). Mc-
Gowan and Langton both argue that accommodation is a typical process by which
de facto authority arises: the act of publishing pornography would be felicitous only
if certain social norms or practices are in place—it presupposes these norms and
practices—and so pornographywinds up being part ofwhatmakes these very norms
operative.
Perhaps the weakest link in this project is the idea that pornography is speech
in a sense that invites a speech-act-theoretic treatment. Langton mostly does not
try to defend this premise of her argument, instead merely repeating MacKinnon’s
point that the American courts have deemed pornography to be speech for First-
Amendment purposes. But this is not very convincing on its own: “speech” is one
technical term in the context of the American legal system and another technical
term in the context of a theory of illocutionary acts. It is not obvious that the exten-
sions of these two technical terms are sufficiently aligned for Langton’s purposes.
Langton has sometimes responded to this worry by pointing out that it suits her
broader purposes if pornography does not turn out to be speech. For example: “No-
tice that if [pornography does not work as speech after all], then feminist arguments
against pornography ought to have an easier time of it than they do, since it cannot
be a right to free speech that protects pornography, if anything does” (Langton and
West, , ). But this does not address our point. Some things count as speech
by the technical definition of the American legal system—e.g., monetary contribu-
tions to political campaigns—that probably don’t count as speech by either ordinary
or speech-act-theoretic standards. The question is whether pornography is one of
these things.
There are reasons for doubt. One is the problem of saying who is the “speaker”
of pornography. This interacts with the authority question in interesting ways. No
individual pornographic actor, director, producer, or publisher has authority over
societal norms. It is more plausible that the industry as a whole has this power. But
it is doubtful whether an industry is a well-enough organized entity to be capable of
performing illocutionary acts. Pornography also seems to lack some of the essen-
tial characteristics of illocutionary acts by the standards of most theories of speech
acts. An intentionalist can object that there is no communicative intention to sub-
ordinate behind pornography; most pornographers presumably intend merely to
For another accounts of how pornography may achieve authority, see McGlynn ().
For a different argument that pornography is not authoritative, see Green (). See also Lang-
ton’s (, ch.) response.
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makemoney and perhaps also gratify themselves. A Searlean conventionalist might
additionally object that pornography has no sincerity or preparatory conditions,
and does not have straightforward propositional content. A Brandomian could ob-
ject that someone who creates or publishes pornography needn’t thereby commit
themselves to any content, any more than someone who publishes any other work
of fiction. Even Austin, whose work has had the most direct influence on Langton,
might object that it is difficult to articulate the felicity conditions of an act of sub-
ordinating women by creating or publishing pornography, such that failure to meet
these conditions would result in a misfire or an abuse (see Austin , ). Un-
less objections like these can be satisfactorily answered, one worries that the idea of
pornography as an illocutionary act is crudely metaphorical.
One attempt to answer some of these objections is due to McGowan, (;
; ), who argues that exercitive speech acts that operate via amechanism like
presupposition accommodation lack many of the features that speech-act theorists
have thought essential to speech acts, including communicative intentions, uptake
requirements, and propositional content. McGowan goes on to argue that this is the
rightway to construe pornography as a kind of speech act, and draws on a normative
theory of illocutionary acts in order to do so (see also McGowan ).
Some of the same theoretical moves that have been applied in these debates over
pornography have also been used to understand other kinds of harmful, subordi-
nating speech. Interestingly, these theories have often been built on conflicting
approaches to the nature of speech acts, and so have posited different mechanisms
by means of which speech acts manipulate social norms. Langton’s influential early
work is framed in largely Austinian terms, though more recent work by Langton,
McGowan, Maitra, and others also borrows from work by Stalnaker and Lewis on
presupposition accommodation. Stanley () develops a similar theory of how
some forms of propaganda do their work by sneaking “not-at-issue content” into the
common ground of a whole society (as it were). Maitra, McGowan, and Langton
have developed analogous treatments of how hate speech inflicts harm by covertly
manipulating social norms. Meanwhile, Tirrell () has developed an account
of how hate speech creates the conditions for political oppression and violence that
builds on a theory of speech acts inspired by the normative-functionalist views of
of Sellars and Brandom.
For more detailed discussions of this work, see Maitra andMcGowan’s chapter on “Language and
Free Speech” in this volume, as well as the chapters in Maitra and McGowan ().
See the chapter on propaganda by Stanley and Beaver in this volume for discussion of this and
other work on propaganda.
Langton (a,b); Maitra (); McGowan (, , ).
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. Silencing Speech Acts
All theories of speech acts agree that successfully performing an illocutionary act re-
quires more than performing a locutionary act—more than the utterance of mean-
ingful expressions. This raises the possibility of manipulating speakers’ ability to
meet these further conditions, either by undermining the conditions necessary for
performing an illocutionary act or by creating the conditions for the performance
of an illocutionary act against the will of the speaker. The former phenomenon has
been dubbed “silencing” (Hornsby, ; Langton, ) and “illocutionary dis-
ablement” (Maitra, ) and the latter has been called “extracted speech” (McK-
inney, ).
The notion of illocutionary silencing emerged from the same feminist critique
of pornography discussed in §.. In addition to subordinating women, MacK-
innon () argues, pornography also silences them—a claim that forms the basis
of an argument for regulating pornography on free-speech grounds. In building
their case for this claim, Langton () and Hornsby () both take inspiration
fromAustin’s view that performing an illocutionary act normally requires achieving
“uptake”:
I cannot be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what I say
and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect must be achieved on
the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out. …Generally
the effect amounts to bringing about the understanding of themeaning
and of the force of the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary
act involves the securing of uptake. (Austin, , –)
Langton andHornsby claim that the act of felicitously refusing sex likewise requires
securing uptake—that in order for someone to successfully perform the act of refus-
ing sex, their addressee must understand them as doing so. By manipulating men’s
expectations about female sexual desire, Langton and Hornsby argue, pornography
lowers the chance that its consumers will understand acts of refusing sex, and so
lowers the chance that womenwho attempt to refuse sexwill secure uptake. Pornog-
raphy thus systematically undermines the felicity conditions of refusing sex, thereby
making the act impossible for some women to perform.
A precursor is due to Frye (, ), who uses the notion to theorize situations in which women
are unable to express anger due to structural oppression.
It is worth pointing out that Austinian speech-act theory gives us several other ways to diagnose
what is going wrong in cases of silencing, since Austin takes speech acts to possess a variety of fe-
licity conditions. Hesni () explores some of these other options, arguing that an act of refusing
sex may misfire (or may be treated as misfiring) because the speaker lacks (or is treated as lacking)
standing, which is (roughly) the social position one needs in order to authoritatively perform a given
illocutionary act.

As Maitra (), Unnsteinsson (), and others have pointed out, the phe-
nomenon of silencing is interesting in ways that go far beyond the use of it to un-
derstand the effects of pornography. It is plausible that silencing is a mechanism
of structural oppression across many domains, as prejudice prevents the members
of oppressed groups frommaking themselves understood in the performance of all
manner of illocutionary acts. Since the ability to perform some speech acts—those
involved in political deliberation and protest, for example—may be considered con-
stitutive of full citizenship in a democracy, silencing and the mechanisms by which
it happens should be of paramount interest to political philosophers.
There are interesting questions about how the notion of silencing can be taken
up by speech-act theorists who do not share the Austinian approach onwhich Lang-
ton and Hornsby’s approach is based. One matter of controversy is the claim that
securing uptake is a necessary condition for performing an illocutionary act. In-
tentionalists typically draw finer-grained distinctions between ways that a commu-
nicative act can succeed. Performing an act requires making an utterance with a
communicative intention—(i) an intention to produce a response (such as a belief)
in an addressee, (ii) an intention for the addressee to recognize intention (i), and
(iii) an intention for the addressee to satisfy (i) as a result of satisfying (ii) (Grice,
, ). To successfully communicate requires that the addressee recognize
which response the speaker intends to produce, thereby satisfying clause (ii). Ac-
tually producing this response is a further, extra-communicative achievement: it is
possible to be understood without being persuasive. Uptake, on this view, is identi-
fied with the fulfillment of clause (ii) of a communicative intention (Strawson, ,
). Although securing uptake is a necessary (and sufficient) condition for success-
ful communication, it is not a necessary condition for performing an illocutionary
act.
On this view, someone who cannot secure uptake is not prevented from per-
forming an illocutionary act, but they are prevented from communicating. Maitra
() argues that this sort of inability to communicate still deserves to be thought
of as a pernicious form of silencing, sincemuch of the social and political value of in
our ability to perform communicative acts lies in our ability to communicate with
them. What use is someone’s ability to state political opinions, to engage in protest,
or to refuse sex, one might ask, if others are systematically incapable of understand-
ing?
Unnsteinsson () points out a further mechanism by which silencing might
work, given the intentionalist view. Most theorists of intention, including inten-
tionalists about speech acts, hold that it is either impossible or irrational to in-
See, for example, Strawson () and Harris ().

tend what one believes can’t be done. Someone who is aware that they are in a
communication-undermining predicament of the kind that Maitra describes will
therefore be unable to (rationally) attempt to communicate, and so will be unable
to (rationally) perform a communicative act at all. Unnsteinsson also argues that
a speaker in this situation may believe that they are powerless to communicate in
a situation like this, and yet be sufficiently self-deceived about this belief that they
go through the motions of performing a speech act without actually having the in-
tentions necessary to genuinely perform it. These forms of silencing undermine
speakers’ ability to perform illocutionary acts, and not merely their ability to com-
municate with them.
Other theories of speech acts give us different ways of understanding how si-
lencing works. Stanley () adopts Williamson’s () view that assertion is
constitutively governed by the norm that one must assert only what one knows. It
follows that in contexts where the knowledge norm is not operative, genuine asser-
tion becomes impossible. Stanley argues that U.S. political discourse is on the cusp
of falling into this state, to the detriment of all those involved, because Americans
have all but ceased to expect political actors to say only what they know, and have
stopped holding them accountable when they fail tomeet this standard. If Stanley is
right, then genuine assertion is on the verge of becoming impossible in U.S. political
contexts. Kukla () builds a theory of silencing using tools from the normative
framework of Kukla and Lance (). On Kukla’s view, illocutionary acts are ways
of altering normative statuses, such as commitments and entitlements. Crucially,
though, Kukla and Lance argue that speech acts can be performed only when cer-
tain “input conditions” are met, and these input conditions themselves consist of
normative statuses possessed by those involved. Facts about social power—for ex-
ample, the fact that employees generally aren’t entitled to give commands to their
boss—make certain illocutionary acts available to some speakers but not others.
On Kukla’s view, if social practices are arranged in such a way that women’s social
power is systematically undermined, then they too may simply be unable to per-
form speech acts, such as commands, that presuppose that power, even if they are
nominally in positions that grant them the authority to do so.
Finally, McKinney () has argued that just as attempted illocutionary acts
may be silenced, they may also be extracted from speakers against their interests
or will. This can happen either as a result of a situation that incentivizes or tricks
speakers into saying things that will come back to haunt them—as in McKinney’s
example of unjust police confessions—or it may happen when speakers are manip-
ulated into satisfying the felicity conditions of illocutionary acts with whose rules
See, for example, Bratman (); Broome (); Donnellan (); Grice (); Neale ().
This is closely related to what Dotson () calls “illocutionary smothering”.

they are unfamiliar.
. Freedom of Speech
Many democracies accord their citizens a right to free speech, and protect this right
by constitutionally limiting the ways in which the state can interfere with citizens’
speech. In this context, ‘speech’ sometimes has an expansive definition. In the
United States, for example, speech may include the publication of pornography
and donations to political action committees, and these activities enjoy consider-
able protection from government regulation.
Still, there is much variation in what kinds of speech are protected in different
jurisdictions and at different times. For example, defamation is subject to crimi-
nal or civil liability in many countries, though the details vary considerably. The
Swedish Criminal Code (Ch. , Sec. ) specifies a special punishment of up to six
years for defamation of the King or another member of the Royal Family. Arti-
cle  of the Danish Criminal Code specifies a punishment of up to four years for
defaming the deceased. Hate speech is another variable category of exception to
free-speech protections. Germany has strict laws against hate speech, including, for
example, a prohibition on “denying or downplaying” the Holocaust—a crime that is
punishable by up to five years in prison (German Criminal Code, §.). By con-
trast, the First Amendment of the United States Constitution has been interpreted
so as to protect nearly all forms of hate speech. In the words of Schauer (), this
is one thing that makes the United States’ expansive free-speech protection “a re-
calcitrant outlier to a growing international understanding of what the freedom of
expression entails” (). This variation makes salient the question of which speech
protections are just, and why?
Most traditional arguments for free-speechprotections presuppose that the speech
being protected is assertoric, and that its function is to express beliefs or opinions.
For example, Mill () defends broad speech protection on the ground that the
airing of opinions is ultimately for the public good, whether the opinions are true
or false.
But the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it
is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing generation;
thosewhodissent from the opinion, stillmore than thosewhohold it. If
the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging
error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,
Laws against insulting heads of state remain quite common. See Griffen (, –) for further
examples.
For similar examples in other countries, see Griffen (, –).

the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its
collision with error. (Mill, , ch.)
A defense of free speech framed in this way is open to an accusation of ignoring
the fact that we do many things other than express beliefs when we speak. A basic
awareness of speech-act theory thus raises deep and challenging questions about
what forms of speech—which speech acts—should enjoy state protection.
This line of thought has been the basis for several critiques of expansive, American-
style free-speechprotections. One implication of the feminist arguments that pornog-
raphy silences women (see §.) is that pornography is a threat to free speech, since
it undermines the possibility of performing illocutionary acts that, quite plausibly,
ought to count as protected speech. Hornsby and Langton () draw out this im-
plication, arguing that laws that protect the publication of pornography undermine
rather than support free speech.
In a similar vein, McGowan () argues that some acts of hate speech should
be regulated on the grounds that they they constitute illocutionary acts of discrimi-
nating against their target groups, and don’t merely cause discrimination. Waldron
() defends the regulation of hate speech on the ground that its publication con-
stitutes an act of undermining the basic dignity of its targets, and ultimately their
status as equal citizens (–, ). AlthoughTirrell () does not drawout the im-
plications of her analysis of hate speech for free-speech law, a similar upshot to that
of Waldron is easy to anticipate. In the right conditions, Tirrell argues, hate speech
enacts a normative framework that permits terrible acts of oppression and violence.
Since to do this is to undermine basic human rights, Tirrell’s analysis would seem
to offer support for the regulation of hate speech in at least some contexts.
Beyondoffering us these avenues to critique broad free-speech protections, speech-
act theory forces us to confront fine-grained questions about how to interpret the
free-speech law that already exists. To take just one example, the First Amendment
to theUnited States’ constitution tells us that “congress shallmakeno law…abridging
the freedom of speech”. How should we translate this directive into the idiom of
speech-act theory, with its multifarious distinctions? Jacobson () argues that
the first amendment protects only the freedom to perform locutionary acts, and
not the freedom to perform illocutionary acts. After all: as Austin showed, many
illocutionary acts, such as the act of performing a wedding ceremony or placing
someone under arrest, are limited to the purview of speakers acting in particular
institutional roles that grant them unique powers. Hornsby and Langton ()
grant Jacobson’s point that we lack a blanket right to perform any illocutionary act
whatsoever, but argue that freedom of speech does entail the freedom to perform
communicative acts. Similarly, Maitra and McGowan (; ) argue that free-
speech protections should not be understood to protect any illocutionary acts that

enact obligations, including the exercitive acts that, they argue, are constituted by
pornography and hate speech. Perhaps themost fully worked-out theory in this vein
is due to Solum (), who develops a detailed theory on which freedom of speech
should be equated with freedom of communicative action, in the sense theorized by
Habermas ().
 Loose Ends
We have attempted to give an opinionated tour of some of the fruitful intersections
of speech-act theory and social and political philosophy. Of course, there are var-
ious other overlaps that we would have liked to explore, given more space. One
example is the role of speech acts in deliberative democracy—a topic that is at the
core of Habermas’ (; ) theory of communicative action. A second example
is the analogy between the roles played by cooperativity and trust in communica-
tion, on one hand, and in human social organization more generally, on the other
(see, for example, Williams ). A third is the influence of speech-act theory on
ideas about gender performativity (Butler, ; Salih, ). Although the forego-
ing survey has not been exhaustive, however, we hope to have shown off some of
the ways in which the theory of speech acts has proven illuminating outside of the
narrow confines of the philosophy of language.
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